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Mason Ladd Lecture
A Right to Every Woman's Evidence*
Richard 0. Lempertt
I am indeed honored to be here with you today, honored to be joining you next year as Iowa's first Mason Ladd Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law, and honored to be giving the first Mason Ladd Lecture.
The honor lies not just in the recognition you accord me, but also in the
linkage to the man in whose name this recognition is given.
When I accepted Dean Hines' invitation to give this talk Dean Ladd
was still alive, and I had hoped very much that on this visit I would meet
him. Now I must know him only by reputation, a scholarly reputation
that placed him among the giants in the field of evidence and a reputation as an educator which for many years made his name synonymous
with this great law school. I shall not attempt to say more about Dean
Ladd, for you know more about him than I could tell, but I shall turn
instead to a topic in the field he loved best.
I would like to talk to you about the recent case of Trammel v.
United States.I Trammel is a simple case. A man, Otis Trammel, his wife
Elizabeth Ann, and several others were involved in a conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States. Elizabeth, a courier for the group, was
caught with four ounces of heroin during a routine customs search in
Circuit, was one of three men
Hawaii. Otis, we are told by the Tenth
2
who "masterminded" the operation.
They say "it takes a thief to catch a thief." One might add, "it takes
a conspirator to convict a conspirator." Often the best--and sometimes
the only-evidence that a person has been active in a conspiracy is
testimony from the person he has conspired with. There are two problems with securing such testimony. The first is that each conspirator has
a fifth amendment right not to give testimony that might tend to incrimi* This paper was presented as the first annual Mason Ladd Lecture at The University
of Iowa College of Law on March 13, 1981.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1964, Oberlin College;
J.D. 1968, Ph.D. 1971, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Judy Cox and Victoria List who aided me in researching contemporary and historical aspects of the spousal
immunity. I am grateful to the Cook Funds of the University of Michigan Law School
which allowed me to employ two such capable assistants. I would also like to thank my
colleagues Tom Green and John Reed for their helpful comments on a draft version of
this manuscript and my secretary Dorothy Blair for her patience and skill in making
numerous "final" changes.
1. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
2. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1978).
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nate him-and almost anything that tends to incriminate a fellow conspirator will incriminate the speaker as well-and the second is that
totally apart from the danger of self-incrimination there may be a degree
of honor among theives; a person may simply not want to testify against a
partner in crime. Fortunately, the state can overcome each obstacle, the
first by giving use immunity thereby negating the fifth amendment claim
and the second by offering a reward-such as an agreement not to prosecute -sufficient to overcome any natural hesitancy to turn on one's
fellows.
In Trammel, the prosecutor, whether from delicate feelings of
chivalry, a sense of relative blameworthiness, or a good -idea as to who
would break first under pressure, chose not to indict the two women
involved provided they would testify against the three men. So far, so
good; justice is on its way to being done. However, there was one hitch.
Elizabeth Ann Trammel was Otis Trammel's wife and under a rule of
law which Wigmore called the privilege for anti-marital facts, 3 but which
I prefer to call the spousal immunity, 4 Trammel had an apparent right
to prevent his wife from testifying against him.
This rule, or privilege if you will, apparently arose in the late sixteenth century. Its existence is implied by a case in Chancery in 15796
6
and it is mentioned frequently enough in the early seventeenth century,
that one may safely presume a somewhat earlier existence. The rule provides, with certain exceptions not applicable in Trammel, that one
spouse may not testify against the other in a criminal case. 7 Since spouses
were not barred by this rule from testifying on behalf of each other8 the
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-2245 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
4. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG. A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 679 (1977).

5. Bent v. Allot, Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (Ch. 1579-1580).
6. Early treatises noting the privilege are: COKE, COMMENTARIES UPON LITrLETON

§

6b (1628); M. DALTON, THE COUNTRYJUSTICE(1630); and W. HUDSON, A TREATISE OF
THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (c. 1631). With regard to bankruptcy see BROWNLOW &

GOLDESBOROUGH, REPORTS 47 (1654) citing a case from 1613 and the statute 21Jac. 1, c.
19 (1623) which repealed the immunity for spouses of bankrupts in certain circumstances.
Early cases include Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1579-1580), rhe case cited in
BROWNLOW & GOLDESBOROUGH, supra, and the trial in the House of Peers of Mervin
Lord Audley in 1631 as reported in 3 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 401, 413 (establishing an
exception from the immunity when the husband is charged with a crime against the wife).
7. In the early common law it applied in civil as well as criminal cases. Indeed, it was
applied in cases involving third parties in which testimony implicating one's spouse in a
crime was barred although the implicated spouse could not be literally incriminated.
8. A closely related common-law rule prevented interested parties from testifying on
their own behalf. This disqualification of parties on the grounds of interest was held to
bar the favorable testimony of the parties' spouses as well. This disqualification and the
spousal immunity are thought by some commentators to have been closely linked-both
aspects of the idea that husband and wife are one. However, the distinct nature of the two
rules is implicit in some of the earliest writings and is clearly stated in eighteenth century
cases and treatises. Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1579-1580), is a case in which a
defendant examined his own wife as a witness. The court held that the examination
would be suppressed if the plaintiff did not allow her to be cross-examined. Hudson, after
citing the civil unity (husband and wife are one) argument, notes a case in which a wife
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common-law rule meant, in effect, that one spouse could not testify
against another over the other spouse's objection. It is this rule that has
been transformed, in a way I shall soon describe, by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Trammel and by the decisions of numerous state courts and
legislatures before that. A related rule, which protects the confidentiality
of private marital communications, has not been affected by these
developments.
Reviewing the history of the spousal immunity, two features stand
out. First, it has almost always been used to bar the testimony of wives
against their husbands.-Of the hundreds of cases I have seen,9 from the
mid-seventeenth century on, only a handful involve men in a position to
incriminate their wives. This distribution no doubt reflects the greater
criminality of the male of our species. I don't know how the sexual
distribution of barred witnesses will be affected by the increasing involvement of women in serious crime, but it is fair to say that until now the
rule has operated primarily as a limit on the law's right to every woman's
was examined against her husband and it was held that if the husband cross-examined
the wife her testimony would have been admitted since both sides "allowed her." M. HUD.
SON, A TREATISE OFTHE COURT OF THE STAR CHAMBER 205 (c. 1631). These cases suggest
that at the time the immunity was emerging the distinction between the immunity and
disqualification for interest was recognized for both could be waived and different rules of
waiver applied to each.
In Rex v. Cliviger, 100 Eng. Rep. 143 (K.B. 1788), Judge Gross wrote:
But in all the books which treat of evidence, there are certain technical rules
laid down ....

Some of these relate to husband and wife; and we find the

general rule as to them to be founded, not on the ground of interest, but of
policy; by which it is established that a wife shall not be called to give testimony
in any degree to criminateher husband .... On the first trial the objection was
considered by Gould, J. on the ground of interest, and considering it merely in
that light, he might have done right in overruling it: but the true and best
ground of objection is not that of interest, but is founded on the political inconvenience of causing dissensions in families between husband and wife; and so it
is put by Lord Hale. In Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown the objection also is considered in the same view; and my Lord Hardwicke adopted it in the case before

him.
Id. at 146 (emphasis original).
In BULLER'S NiSI PRIUS 309 (1773) one reads: "That Husband and Wife cannot be
admitted to Witness for each other, because their Interests are absolutely the same; nor
against each other, because contrary to the legal Policy of Marriage."
The situation may have been temporarily confused toward the end of the century
when Lord Kenyon in the case of Davis v. Dinwoody, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B. 1792),
interpreted an argument based on the separate rationales for the disqualification and the
immunity to assert the rule that husbands and wives are not allowed to testify for or
against each other because they were, in his words, "so nearly connected, they are supposed to have such a bias upon their minds that they are not to be permitted to give
evidence either for or against each other." Id. But the arguments of counsel in this case
indicate that the distinction between the disqualification and the immunity and the
rationales for each were well recognized by this time, even if the particular court chose to
ignore them in stating a broad rule.
9. More precisely, my research assistants Victoria List and Judy Cox have looked at
these cases and reported on them to me.
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evidence. In view of this, I shall abandon the sex neutral term "spouse"
that I have thus far used and shall instead refer to testifying or
witness spouses as "wives" and defendant spouses as "husbands."
Second, although the rule may have its origins in attitudes which we
regard today as irrational, such as the notion that husband and wife are
in some sense one or that for a woman to incriminate her husband is akin
to petty treason, it is also the case that from the earliest times an important justification for the rule was what we would today call an argument
from public policy, namely, that to allow one spouse to testify against
another might cause "implacable discord and dissension" and so threaten
a marriage. 10
10. As far as I can tell this phrase first appears in 1628 in ConE., COMMENTARIES
UPON LITTLETON (1628). Coke writes:

[A] wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, qua sunt duae
animae in came una [because they are two souls in one body]; and it might be a
cause of implacable discord and dissention between the husband and the wife....
Id. § 6b. Note that Coke is talking about both the disqualification from interest which
meant that one spouse could not testify for another if the other was barred by interest
from testifying and the bar to adverse testimony. It is possible that the Latin phrase was
meant to apply solely to the interest disqualification and the policy argument solely to the
immunity. If so, Coke's statement occasioned confusion because some later courts confound the disqualification from interest with the immunity or attribute the immunity to
both the mystical oneness of husband and wife and the implications that adverse
testimony would have for the marriage. However, it appears that during the next two centuries the courts more often than not distinguish correctly between the disqualification
and the immunity and justify the immunity by reference to the policy argument. Perhaps
the argument from mystical oneness has received the prominance it has in the debate
because it is such a convenient whipping boy for those opposed to the privilege. For example, Chief Justice Burger, in Trammel, suggests that the original reason for the privilege
was a demeaning view of women inherent in the idea that husband and wife were one.
445 U.S. at 44, 52. The argument regarding marital harmony is considered the "modem
justification." Id. at 44. Yet we see that both arguments can be traced to Coke and it may
be that the civil unity argument was never taken as the primary justification for the
immunity. Mary Grigg's Case (1672), reported in Sir Thomas Raymond, Reports of
Divers Special Cases 1 (1743), the first reported case I could find citing Coke in support of
excluding a spouse's testimony, refers only to Coke's policy rationale. Id. Many early cases
give no justification for excluding a spouse's testimony but simply cite what was by then
regarded as a settled rule. Those cases providing a rationale for the rule include: Barker
v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171, 171 (K.B. 1736) (marital harmony rationale); Bentley v.
Cooke, 99 Eng. Rep. 729, 729-30 (K.B. 1784) (at least one justice, Buller, was apparently
influenced by the domestic harmony argument); Rex v. Cliviger, 100 Eng. Rep. 143, 144
(K.B. 1788) (marital harmony rationale); Davis v. Dinwoody, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241, 1241
(K.B. 1792) (bias); State v. Gardner, 1 Conn. (Root) 485, 485 (1793) (husband's interest
because in testifying to wife's adultery he might be laying a foundation for divorce). It is
noteworthy that of these cases, which with one exception are the only pre-1800 cases I
could find that state a rationale for excluding spousal testimony, none cites the mystical
unity of husband and wife that modern critics assume was the source of the rule. The exception is Windham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burrows 414 (K.B. 1757), in which Lord Mansfield
wrote: "In matter of evidence, husband and wife are considered as one; and cannot be
witnesses, the one for the other. The husband cannot be witness for his Wife, in a question touching her separate estate." Id. at 424 (emphasis original). Despite his bold state-
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"Implacable discord and dissension": the phrase has a nice ring to
it. Not only is it sonorous; it is also sensible. One can easily imagine marriages that would be destroyed if a wife, forced to testify against her husband, chose not to perjure herself, but instead played a crucial part in
convincing the jury that her husband was guilty of a heinous crime. This
is particularly so at the time this rationale arose, for in the seventeenth
century all felonies were in principle punishable by death."
Nevertheless, there are cases where one wonders how an honest
court could cite this marital harmony rationale. For example, in one of
the few cases where the rule sealed male lips, dangers of marital discord
and dissension are the court's cited justification for refusing to receive a
man's testimony that his wife had left him and bigamously married
another.1 2 One can only admire a marriage that remained sufficiently
harmonious despite the wife's desertion and remarriage that it was
vulnerable to further discord should the first husband testify against the
wife.
Or, conversely, one can only deplore a privilege which denies the
law valuable information on the pretext of preserving marriages that
have long since been destroyed by the behavior of the spouses. The
privilege becomes even more deplorable if one believes that the policy
justification is itself questionable. Jeremy Bentham, one of the earliest
and most strident critics of the rule, wrote:
It disturbs domestic confidence. Whose? Those who abuse it
to disturb the public security. A miscreant, then, who could be
convicted of an atrocious crime by the testimony of a woman,
has nothing to fear; if he has only time to go through the marriage-ceremonyl No asylum ought to be open for criminals;
every sort of confidence among them must be destroyed, if
possible, even in the interior of their own houses. If they can
neither find mercenary protectors among the lawyers, nor conment of the civil unity rationale, Mansfield is talking only about testimony for a spouse in
a civil case. Here the civil unity argument is neither mystical nor demeaning to the
woman. At a time when witnesses were unable to testify if they had an interest in the outcome of the case, the civil unity of husbands and wives meant that if one spouse had a
financial interest in the outcome of a civil suit the other spouse was almost certain to have
a similar interest.
11. In fact the "benefit of clergy" was widely available at that time and where it was
not pardons were often obtained.
12. Mary Grigg's Case, reported in Sir Thomas Raymond, Reports of Divers Special
Cases 1 (1743). For cases in which a wife's testimony was not allowed as proof of her husband's alleged bigamy, see Broughton v. Harpur, 2 Raymond 752, 752 (K.B. 1701-1702),
and Rex v. Cliviger, 100 Eng. Rep. 143, 147 (K.B. 1788) (Grose, J.). For a modem decision barring a wife from testifying after her husband had deserted her and remarried,
see United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge L. Hand who wrote the
decision agreed that the marriage in question was wrecked and could not be saved, but he
did not believe the rule should be changed to require courts to make judgments about the
viability of particular marriages. Id. at 568.

66 IOWA LAW REVIEW 725 [1981]

cealment at their own firesides, what harm is done? Why, they
are compelled to obey the laws, and live like honest people' 3
Wigmore found an answer to Bentham when he suggested that the
real reason for the spousal immunity was that "there is a natural
repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband
to be the means of the other's condemnation .... 14 However, Wigmore
was not satisfied with his own answer:
This reason, if we reflect upon it, is at least founded on a
fact, and it seems after all to constitute the real and sole
strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege. Let it be
confessed, then, that this feeling exists, and that it is a natural
one. But does it suffice as a reason for the rule? In the first
place, it is not more than a sentiment. It does not posit any
direct and practical consequence of evil. It is much the same
reason that anyone might give for abolishing the office of spies
in a war. In the next place, it exemplifies that general spirit of
sportsmanship which, as elsewhere seen, so permeates the rules
of procedure inherited from our Anglo-Norman ancestors. The
process of litigation (many learned judges agree) is a noble kind
of sport, and certain rules of fair play should never be overstepped. One of these is to give something of a start to the victim of
the chase, to follow him by certain rules only and to respect his
feelings so far as may be. This complicates the sport, and adds
zest for the pursuers by increasing the skill and art required by
them for success. The expedient of convicting a man out of the
mouth of his wife is (let us say) poor sport, and we shall not
stoop to it. Such is the theory and the sentiment of sportsmanship. 15

You can be sure that when a law professor attributes a rule to sport
and sentiment his next step will be to urge its abolition for litigation is,
quoting again from Wigmore, "not a game, and ... the law can never
afford to recognize it as such; ...the law, moreover, does not proceed by

sentiment, but aims at justice.' 6 Yet is the wife's stake in the matter only
sentiment? Is there not injustice in forcing the wife-presumably an
innocent party- to play the crucial role in the condemnation of her husband? If she balks at this and refuses to testify or lies from the stand is it
just that we send her to prison for her contempt or her crime? Indeed, is
our preference for justice ultimately anything more than a sentiment?
When opposed by other sentiments, such as those we have toward family
13. J. BENTHAM,, A TREATISE

1825).
14. 8

J.

WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE

original).
15. Id. (footnotes omitted).
16. Id.

ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

238 (M. Dumont ed., London,

§ 2228, at 217 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis
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units, love, and the suffering of innocent people should justice always
prevail?
Let us pause and take stock. We have a rule that has been with us
for almost four centuries and subjected to scathing criticism for much of
the last two. One of its rationales, the unity of husbands and wives, has
been completely discredited and another, our repugnance at seeing wives
testify against husbands, has been dismissed as mere sentiment, although
we may want to dispute this dismissal. The third, the implications of
forced testimony for marital peace, still stands. One may argue, as
Wigmore does, that among the "multifold circumstances of life that contribute to cause marital dissension, the liability to give unfavorable
testimony appears as only a casual and minor one,' 1 7 but this misses the
point. The concern is not with the ordinary marriage where the liability
to give testimony remains inchoate but with the rare marriage where but
for the privilege the testimony would be forced.' 8 In these cases the
liability to give testimony might well be a cause of substantial dissension,
and only in these cases can the abrogation of the immunity lead to more
just results.
In cases where the privilege is invoked we are trading off the probable destruction of marriages and the probable anguish of innocent
spouses against an increased likelihood that justice will be done. For the
moment, we can consider the question of whether to allow this tradeoff as
the basic policy choice. In balancing the competing interests we should
realize that requiring the wife's testimony will not necessarily destroy the
marriage. But, by the same token, abrogation of the immunity will not
necessarily change an unjust result to a just one. If the wife refuses to
testify nothing is gained at trial although we have whatever dubious
satisfaction comes from seeing a contumacious witness punished. If the
husband is guilty and the wife lies or if the husband is innocent but the
wife testifies truthfully to incriminatory facts, it is the probability of
injustice that has been enhanced by abrogating the rule. Even if the husband is guilty and the wife testifies truthfully justice is not necessarily
furthered, for the wife's testimony may have been unnecessary to the conviction or her credibility might have been destroyed on cross-examination
by the revelation of information that would only be known to an intimate.
Bentham's argument, picked up by Wigmore when he says it is a
curious policy that allows a wrongdoer's interest (in his marriage) to be
17. Id. at 216.

18. The immunity, unlike the privilege for confidential marital communications, has
never been defended on the grounds that its existence enhances the stability of marriages

generally. Thus, if Wigmore's point is that the existence of the immunity has virtually no
impact on the general divorce rate, he is correct, but he is not responding to the marital

harmony justification for the privilege. Instead, he is attacking a straw man that even he
has not raised.
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weighed in deciding whether he should be allowed to bar testimony
against him,19 neglects the interests of innocent spouses as well as the
interests which children and others have in keeping families together. We
may have no sympathy for the wrongdoer and no respect for his interests,
but we still might not want to force the innocent spouse to experience the
anguish of testifying against her husband, nor, for the family's sake, do
we want a marriage that might be intact upon acquittal, probation, or
20
parole to be destroyed by the trial process.
But if Wigmore's arguments are wrong on these counts, he appears
right on another. In applying the immunity the law never asks whether a
particular marriage is indeed viable. Not only does the law not ask
whether the marriage is worth preserving (a judgment we would probably not want courts to make); it also does not ask whether there is any
marriage left to preserve. If there isn't, it makes no sense to deprive a
court of evidence.
Surely once a marriage reaches the point where the wife is willing to
testify against her husband there cannot be much of a marriage left to
save. Furthermore, a wife willing to testify against her spouse is unlikely
to suffer anguish at playing a role in his conviction. Thus, the strongest
arguments for this marital privilege, the arguments from marital harmony and wifely anguish, have the same Achilles' Heel. At most they
justify a privilege for the witness spouse. They do not justify allowing a
defendant spouse to keep a witness spouse off the stand. Lawyers and law
professors have been making these arguments for years. In Trammel the
19. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 216 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
20. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Trammel is interesting because it employs a
variant of Wigmore's argument to justify the district court's abrogation of the spousal
immunity. You will recall that Trammel and his wife were coconspirators. The court of
appeals used this circumstance to justify a denial of the privilege, treating a marriage of
criminals as though it were a "criminal marriage" entitled to none of the law's tender
mercies. Judge McKay, dissenting, properly pointed out that there was no evidence that
the marriage was contracted to facilitate crime nor was there any reason to believe that
the Trammels enjoyed criminal activity to the exclusion of those other shared intimacies
that make marriage worthwhile and give the state an interest in preserving it. 583 F.2d at
1173 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting). The majority of the Tenth Circuit panel
was also influenced by the fact that the wife had been granted immunity by the government, id. at 1168, but this should have had no implications for the applicability of the
privilege. Immunity protected the wife's fifth amendment interest; the issue in Trammel
was the husband's interest in not being incriminated by his wife's testimony. It is interesting to note that this case probably would not have reached the Supreme Court but for
serious analytical mistakes by the trial judge and the majority upon first appeal. Portions
of the trial transcript reproduced in the defendant's brief suggest that the trial judge
could never be made to realize, despite the attempts of counsel, that the federal courts
recognized a spousal immunity that was distinct from the privilege for confidential
marital communications. The majority on the Tenth Circuit felt, with no justification in
law or precedent, that the Government's ability to grant fifth amendment immunity to a
witness in some way undercut another's right to claim a privilege with respect to that
witness' testimony. Id.
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nation's highest court finally listened. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of
the Court, wrote:
When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In
these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused
to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to
frustrate justice than to foster family peace. 2'
Here it appears we have a happy ending or at least a rational one,
which is the same thing to most legal scholars. The rule is preserved,
reaffirming our judgment about the special quality of marriages and our
reluctance to force a woman to condemn someone she loves. But where
the reason for the rule disappears, the rule does also, and courts are not
deprived of valuable evidence.
I would stop here, except that I don't believe what I have just said. I
don't believe Trammel is correctly decided, because I don't believe it is
wise to vest the right to claim the privilege solely in the witness spouse.
Let me tell you why.
Years ago I happened to have a conversation about Earl Warren
with a friend who was a clerk at the Supreme Court when the case of
Hawkins v. United States22 was decided. In Hawkins as in Trammel the

Court was invited to transfer the right to claim immunity from the
defendant to the witness spouse, but in Hawkins the invitation was
declined. My friend told me that when he was at the Court, Chief Justice
Warren was in the habit of lunching on Saturdays with clerks from other
chambers. One Saturday discussion turned to Hawkins. For the clerks the
case was simple; the force of the rational argument that I have outlined
for you could not be denied. The Chief Justice did not find the case so
easy. Speaking as a former prosecutor, he described to the clerks various
ways in which the state can secure apparently voluntary testimony from
an unwilling witness. The clerks, impressed by Warren's knowledge of
the real world and the implicit lesson for those who master only logic,
were even more impressed when it turned out that Hawkins provided an
example of what the Chief Justice had described. The Court learned,
sometime after this luncheon, that Hawkins' wife had been imprisoned as
a material witness and released only after giving a three thousand dollar
bond conditioned upon her appearance in court as a witness for the
United States. 23 As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion,
"These circumstances are hardly consistent with the theory that her
21. 445 U.S. at 52.
22. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).

23. Id. at 83 (Stewart, J., concurring). This information was revealed in a memorandum filed by the Government after the oral argument in the case. Id. at 82 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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testimony was voluntary. '24 Indeed, one is reminded of the English
courts that warned of the danger of implacable discord and dissension
should a person testify against a bigamous spouse. To call the wife's
testimony in Hawkins voluntary, as the government tried to do, is just as
disingenuous.

25

As it turns out the testimony in Trammel is also not voluntary in any
pure sense of the word. It is the product of a plea bargain. To obtain Ms.
Trammel's testimony against her husband the government gave her
immunity for her testimony and advised her that if she cooperated with
the government she might be charged only with a misdemeanor and
receive probation. 26 Ms. Trammel may have testified willingly in a certain sense, for the facts give us every reason to believe that she preferred
seeing her husband in prison to being there herself. But by this standard
Hawkins' wife testified willingly, for she obviously found an agreement to
testify against her husband more congenial than rotting in jail. In neither
instance would I call the testimony voluntary.
It is also likely that by the time of Trammel's trial his marriage was
destroyed. Chief Justice Burger certainly thought so, for as I've told you
he wrote: "When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding- whatever the motivation-their relationship is
almost certainly in disrepair." 27 Yet what follows from this if the
disrepair was caused, as we may assume for sake of arguxment, solely
because of the Government's efforts. 28 Surely a court that acknowledges
the privilege's importance to marital harmony by continuing to vest it in
the witness spouse should not tolerate a rule that gives the government
strong incentives to break up those marriages it can. 29
24. Id. at 83 (Stewart, J., concurring).

25. It may be, however, that in Hawkins there was not much of a marriage to save
whether or not the testimony was voluntary. Justice Stewart tells us that Hawkins and his

wife were living apart under different names both at the time of the acts complained of
and at the time of the trial. Id. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. Brief for the United States at 4 n.2, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980). In fact, Ms. Trammel was never prosecuted. Id.
27. 445 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
28. It is not clear what kind of marriage the Trammels had at the time they were
arrested or what the fact of arrest alone would have done to the marriage. I say we may
assume the Government's effort to secure a plea bargain was solely responsible for the
breakup because under the portion of Burger's opinion quoted in the text accompanying
note 27 supra, it appears that the decision would have been the same had the wife's willingness to testify and the consequent destruction of the marriage been entirely because of
the Government's offer to trade leniency for testimony.
29. Chief Justice Burger tries to deal with this issue in a footnote when he writes:
It is argued that abolishing the privilege will permit the Government to come
between husband and wife, pitting one against the other. That too, misses the
mark. Neither Hawkins, nor any other privilege, prevents the Government from
enlisting one spouse to give information concerning the other or to aid in the
other's apprehension. It is only the spouse's testimony in the courtrcom that is
prohibited.
445 U.S. at 52 n.12. However, Burger's answer misses the mark. Because we cannot
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The government is quite open about what's going on. Indeed, one of
the state's primary arguments for vesting the immunity in the witness
spouse is the "injustice to the witness-spouse of vesting in the defendant
the power to destroy the witness-spouse's ability to reach a favorable
arrangement with prosecutors in his or her own case." "[F]uture
Elizabeth Trammels," we are told, "would be prevented by their
husbands' power to invoke the marital privilege from protecting their
interests in avoiding severe punishment."30 In other words it is unfair if
the fact that a couple are married means that the government cannot
destroy their relationship, the way it would the relationship of ordinary
coconspirators, by emphasizing conflicting interests and allowing one
guilty party to promote her well-being by turning in the other. Put
another way, it is unfair to the wife if the state cannot threaten her with
severe penalties if she does not condemn her husband and reward her
with no penalty when she sells him out.
The Supreme Court in Trammel accepted this argument. 31 1 do not.
First of all, I don't think the state has any business turning one spouse
against the other, even if it might advantage the spouse who has turned.
Second, consider the quality of the unfairness that presumably results. A
woman, unable to strike a bargain because she cannot testify against her
husband, is convicted of a crime she has committed. What's wrong with
that? Are we to pity all criminals foolish enough to commit their crimes
without accomplices because there is no one they can betray in exchange
for a lighter sentence? Do criminals with accomplices have, at least if
they are the less culpable, an equal protection claim to an attractive plea
bargain contingent upon their turning state's evidence?
To state these questions is, I think, to answer them. If there is
necessarily prevent government action we deplore does not mean we should give the
government an added incentive to engage in it. In Trammel, for example, the Government's argument presented at text accompanying note 30 infra suggests that in many
cases, including Trammel, the government would have no incentive to put pressure on a
spouse if her testimony were not admissible. Furthermore, if the Court were worried
about the government coercing wives into helping establish criminal cases against their
husbands it might extend the policy of the immunity to bar the fruits of coerced spousal
cooperation from the trial.
30. Brief for the United States at 23-24, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980).
31. Chief Justice Burger wrote in Trammel:
[I]n a case such as this, the Government is unlikely to offer a wife immunity and
lenient treatment if it knows that her husband can prevent her from giving
adverse testimony. If the Government is dissuaded from making such an offer,
the privilege can have the untoward effect of permitting one spouse to escape
justice at the expense of the other.
445 U.S. at 52-53. These comments were made in the course of arguing that marriages
would be just as jeopardized if the accused could bar his spouse from testifying, thus
preventing her from receiving lenient treatment. However, if the government would not
make the offer if the husband held the privilege, the wife would never know that her marriage had disadvantaged her.
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anything wrong with not allowing a wife to waive the immunity, it is that
a guilty husband will go free because a sufficient case cannot be made
against him. But this is the cost of the privilege whether or not the wife
was herself involved in the crime and thus vulnerable to the pressures of
"Let's Make A Deal." We are back to basic value judgments involving the
sanctity of marriages, whatever interest we have in their preservation,
and the anguish of the spouse who testifies.
The fact that a woman is coerced into agreeing to testify does not
mean that the decision to appear "willingly" did not cause her considerable grief. Indeed, it may lead to grief and guilt which will linger
long after a prison sentence would have been served. It is true that the
guilty wife's anguish may be assuaged by the thought that she will be
spared the trauma that goes with criminal punishment, but, by the same
token, an innocent wife's anguish might be assuaged by the material joys
she might purchase if the state paid her a million dollars for her
testimony. I believe we would not allow the state to buy, with a sum of
money, the testimony of a wife who was not involved in her husband's
crime.3 2 If not, I don't see a principled basis for letting the state buy that
testimony with a promise of leniency when the wife is vulnerable to
3
criminal prosecution.
I recognize the spousal immunity has serious costs, but abrogating
the privilege is costly also. I support the privilege because I believe it is an
important symbolic statement of our attitude toward marriage, because I
believe it may play a role in keeping some marriages together at an
extremely stressful moment, and because I believe it spares spouses, who
may be innocent of wrongdoing, the anguish of being forced to testify
against their loved ones. The Court's decision in Trammel is completely
consistent with these values. I believe that decision is wrong because it
mistakenly assumes that testimony is voluntary whenever a wife agrees to
4
take the stand..
32. The quotation from the Court's opinion in Trammel reproduced in the text
accompanying note 27 supra suggests the Court would allow the state to purchase a
waiver from the wife. However, that hypothetical situation is so different from the situation in Trammel that I do not believe the Court would feel bound by this language should
such a situation arise.
33. One might argue that conspirators should always feel the risk of betrayal by their
fellow conspirators or that evidence of fellow conspirators is so necessary to convict that
we should treat conspirators differently from innocent witnesses. If one accepted these
arguments, which I do not, it argues for the complete abrogation of the marital privilege
among conspirators. Note the arguments in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Trammel and
the effective answers of Judge McKay in dissent from that opinion. 585 F.2d at 1168,
1171-72 (McKay, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's decision to vest the privilege in the
witness spouse makes sense only if we accept the basic value judgments about the special
need for the testimony of coconspirators but still want to give an out to the woman who
despite great pressure or temptation wants to stand by her man.
34. We have been talking at length about the situation where the wife is a coconspirator and vulnerable to governmental pressure on that account; but we should not
forget the lesson of Hawkins: the government has ways to put pressure on women who are
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I fear that Trammel will do more than provide occasions on which
the emptiness of moribund marriages will be confirmed. Instead, it will
give the government an incentive to turn spouses against each other- to
break up marriages in the cause of justice. For me this is too high a price
to pay. If justice, in the marginal sense of convicting a few more guilty
men, means we must allow the state to coerce the testimony of spouses, I
am willing to trade a bit of justice for a bit of humanity. Wigmore
would, no doubt, call these sentiments. I suppose they are. But I hope
you share them, and I believe they should continue to inform the law.
Again I should stop, but candor compels me to admit that my
analysis may be as mistaken as that of scholars who treat apparently willing testimony as necessarily voluntary and thus as an indication of a prior
marital breakdown. As I've pointed out, the relationship between a wife's
willingness to testify and the prior state of her marriage raises empirical
questions which logic cannot answer. However, my analysis also turns in
large measure on an empirical judgment: namely that by vesting the
privilege in the witness rather than the defendant spouse we will be
encouraging governmental coercion of at least initially unwilling women.
In fact, a majority of the states have either abolished the spousal
immunity entirely or have vested the privilege in the witness spouse. I
cannot say that wives in these states are often coerced into testifying
against their husbands. Certainly the reported appellate cases provide
scant evidence of coercion. 35 However, we should not read too much into
this. Where the privilege is abrogated or clearly vested in the witness
spouse one would not expect issues involving spousal testimony to be raised
on appeal.
Perhaps where the privilege is not available to the defendant, prosecutors for reasons of tactics or morality, do not attempt to pit spouse
against spouse unless a marriage is obviously dead. If so, we may have the
happy compromise of a rule broad enough to admit important evidence
and prosecutors wise enough not to use it when other values are threatened.
I fear, however, that this view is too optimistic. Enough prosecutors
are warriors against crime-or at least against criminals-that they are
unlikely to sacrifice the chance of a conviction to values like those I have
described. Indeed, tendencies to weigh such values heavily may be
undercut by Trammel. Supreme Court decisions that decide only that a
questionable activity is not prohibited often have the perverse result of
not involved in the charged crime. For a description of how vulnerable material witnesses

may be, see Carlson & Voelpel, Material Witnesses and Material Injustice, 58 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 3 (1980).
35. Researching the case law I (which is to say my research assistant Judy Cox) was
able to find only a handful of cases that suggested the wife's testimony may have been
coerced, and all but one of these involved plea bargaining. See, e.g., Smitherman v.
State, 264 Ala. 120, 122, 85 So. 2d 427, 429 (1956) (wife held in jail as a material witness
for three and one-half months); Sheffield v. State, 241 Ga. 245, 245-46, 244 S.E.2d 869,

870 (1978) (wife granted immunity in exchange for her testimony).
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publicizing questionable tactics and suggesting to many that what was
once troubling is now appropriate. Prosecutors may interpret Trammel
as an indication from the highest Court that it is good practice to induce
wives to testify against their husbands and they certainly will interpret
the case as an indication this is not wrong in any moral sense. Thus, as a
result of Trammel we may see a marked increase in the rate at which
wives are pressured to testify against their husbands even in states where
such testimony has long been permitted.
It is, of course, too early to provide you with evidence of this, but
there is one analogy that may be apt. For most of our constitutional
history, news reporters asserted no special privilege to protect either
information given them in confidence or the identity of their sources, yet
for most of our history reporters were effectively free from subpoena.
While this pattern may have existed in part because reporters were willing to share the information they possessed or because they seldom
appeared to have valuable information, it is also likely that it reflected an
attitude toward the press and the press' role in our lives. About 1968 things
changed as a flurry of subpoenas, usually directed at those who covered
the more "radical" beats, 36 were issued at the instance of prosecutors. It
is possible if not likely that attempts to subpoena reporters would have
evaporated with the radical protests of the late 1960s, but news reporters
chose to assert a first amendment based privilege. In Branzburg v.
Hayes," the Supreme Court, by a five-four vote, denied the reporters'
claim. Since that time subpoenaing reporters has become a standard
information gathering tool of both prosecutors and defense counsel.3 8
Would this pattern have developed had Branzburgnever been brought? I
don't know, but I think not. Branzburg may have both publicized a
source of evidence and legitimated using it. I fear that Trammel will
similarly affect prosecutors' judgments about the appropriateness of
inducing wives to testify against their husbands and that as a consequence important values will suffer.
In conclusion I would like to tell you what this talk is about, or at
least what I have been about. My talk is of course about the spousal
immunity and the Trammel case, but although I feel strongly about
these matters (perhaps more strongly than the issues warrant), I have not
chosen this topic because I think it important to persuade you of my position. I entertain no illusions on the issue that matters. No court, having
abrogated a privilege, has, to my knowledge, subsequently reinstated it.
Instead of considering what I have said, consider what I have been
required to draw on: English legal history of the seventeenth and eight36. On this history see Blasi, The Newsman's Pri ilege: An Empirical Study, 70
MICH.

L. REv. 229 (1971).

37. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38. For cases see various issues of News Media and The Law, a publication of the

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
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eenth centuries; Bentham and Wigmore, each a leading scholar of his
generation; logical analysis as we are taught it in law schools; attorneys'
briefs and Supreme Court opinions; the sociology of prosecutorial
behavior (fraught, to be sure, with empirical inadequacy); and your
responses and mine to questions we cannot escape when values clash.
These are but some of the paths down which the study of evidence takes
you. You know far better than I the joys which Dean Ladd found at this
law school and in this town. I hope that I have given you some sense of
what makes evidence a fascinating field of scholarship (dare I say "the
joys of evidence") and some understanding of why one of the great
figures in the history of this law school chose to devote his scholarly life to
it.

